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Abstract This paper investigates the feasibility of a selective
secondary protective control strategy proposed to maximize
the likelihood of recovery from misoperations of the existing
(primary) protection in a power system. A scalable stochastic
discrete-state model is established, taking into consideration
of the processes of protection misoperations and their miti-
gations. Such misoperations have been a main culprit of cas-
cading failures in modern power systems. The likelihood of
recovery from protection misoperations is quantified by a set
of security indices that formally incorporate the uncertain
knowledge of the continuous-state of rotor angles/speed
deviations of synchronous generators and that of the discrete-
state of equipment faults and primary protection misopera-
tions. The proposed secondary protection leverages on the
ever more available time-synchronized samples of networked
sensors for diagnosis and fault-tolerant control to cost effec-
tively improving power system reliability without altering the
existing protection system. The technology readiness for
implementing the secondary protective control is examined
through a three-area test system.
Keywords Availability and security, Fault-tolerance,
Fault-coverage and fault-diagnosis, Hybrid modeling and
simulation, Primary and secondary protection, Protection
false trips
1 Introduction
Protection misoperations in power systems are a top
reliability concern according to a recent state of reliability
report of the North American Electric Reliability Corpo-
ration (NERC) [1]. Protection misoperations fall into two
broad categories: failures to trip and false trips, where trip
means the removal of a piece of supposedly faulty equip-
ment from the system by opening some circuit breakers.
Equipment faults considered in this paper are three-phase
short to ground faults in transmission lines. The principles
established, however, are applicable to other types of
transmission line faults and faults in other types of equip-
ment. A typical protection system is designed to be
dependable (to trip whenever it should) at the expense of
security (not to trip whenever it should not) [2]. False trips
occur much more often than failures to trip in a stressed
system [1]. False trips are sometimes referred to as hidden
failures. A hidden failure is a permanent defect causing the
incorrect removal of a circuit element as a direct conse-
quence of another triggering event [3]. A system can
become stressed when it is subject to an equipment fault, a
switch, a change in load/generation power, or a severe
event of nature.
Despite the efforts to analyze the impact of protection
misoperations [3–5], to prevent them from occurring
through adaptive relaying [4], and to deploy remedial
action schemes for some specific scenarios [6], funda-
mental study on systematic recovery from false trips upon
an equipment fault remains an uncharted territory.
Recovery from protection misoperations presents a
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significant challenge, given the absence of a formal
mathematical representation for false trips and recovery
processes, as the traditional reliability model typically only
captures equipment failure and system restoration pro-
cesses. The challenge also stems from the fraction-of-a-
second fast response time required of protection
functions.
This work leverages the phasor measurement unit
(PMU)-like sensing technology, which has made a signif-
icant recent entry into the power grids. Typically, analog
inputs to a PMU are 3-phase currents and voltages at the
secondary windings of instrument transformers. They are
filtered and converted into digital signals at thousands of
samples per second. The samples are time-tagged with sub-
microsecond accuracy according to the GPS clock, and
then processed using a discrete Fourier transform or least-
squares methods to produce estimates of positive-sequence
voltage and current phasors at a reporting rate of about
30–120 samples/s. These so-called synchrophasors are the
balanced three-phase steady-state sinusoidal components in
terms of a magnitude and a phase angle for each of the
three AC phases at a fixed frequency. A relay-misoperation
detection method using PMU data from both ends of a
transmission line is presented in [7]. The work presented in
this paper does not require measurements at both ends of a
transmission line. Although different fault diagnosis
methods are proposed recently [8, 9], the dynamics of the
electrical transmission network has not been considered.
This paper involves the electric network dynamics to
promptly identify fault modes and protection misopera-
tions. The current IEEE standard [10], however, does not
specify requirements on PMU responses to power system
transients. This work proposes the use of the time-tagged
input waveform samples of PMU-like sensors, instead of
output samples of PMUs, for estimation of both continu-
ous-state and discrete state through diagnosis of fault
modes in order to gain the speed and accuracy during
severe transients. The development of diagnosis is reported
in [11]. These samples are processed to provide feedback
information for decision support in the proposed selective
secondary protective control strategy.
For the purpose of clarity in defining the scope of this
paper, the NERC’s definition of reliability is adopted. It
contains two functional aspects: adequacy (ability to pro-
vide uninterrupted service), and security (ability to with-
stand large disturbances). Thus reliability in this context is
an overarching measure encompassing both steady-state
availability (adequacy) defined for a discrete state
stochastic process and transient stability (security) defined
for a continuous-state dynamic system whose mode of
operation is determined by the prevailing discrete state.
The fact that availability and security have been viewed as
largely disconnected is evidenced by the separate bodies of
power systems literature [12–15]. This disconnection is an
obstacle hindering the progress in the general area of
mitigation of cascading failures. The issue is recognized in
less than a handful of publications [16, 17].
This paper builds on a stochastic framework first pro-
posed in [18] to tackle recovery from a protection misop-
eration through a selective secondary protective control
under a maximum security criterion. Protective control
actions may include high-speed fault clearing, high speed
reclosing, regulated shunt/series switching of reactive
devices [14]. The qualifier selective to be suppressed in the
following development, refers to the fact that the avail-
ability of PMU-like sensors may allow only partial
implementation of the secondary protection. Primary pro-
tection and secondary protection are used hereafter to
distinguish the existing and newly introduced protection
mechanisms. The desired secondary protective control
takes no action when the primary protection operates cor-
rectly, and a corrective action when the primary protection
fails to trip or falsely trips. This approach is highly cost-
effective, as it keeps the primary protection scheme intact,
which has been both ingeniously and painstakingly
designed to benefit the dependability, while exploiting new
technologies to offer the needed security.
The protection mechanism proposed in this paper takes
the sampled current and voltage waveforms acquired by
instrument transformers as the real-time measurements.
Two types of computations are made in real-time: the
tracking of electro-mechanical state (relative rotor phase
angles and the angular speed deviations of the generators),
and the diagnosis of faults using a multiple model
approach. The control decisions are obtained by combining
the real-time tracked electro-mechanical state and the pre-
computed post-fault stability regions. This protection
scheme drastically reduces the on-line decision time on
transient stability, in comparison with any existing decision
methods
All admissible selective secondary protective control
actions are actuated through switches. The existing study
on switched systems [19] seeks to analyze or construct
switching sequences for asymptotic stability [20, 21]. The
nature of solutions sought here, however, is to maintain the
power system synchronism [14]. Upon entering a tran-
siently unstable configuration, transient stability must be
established before the sojourn time to cascading failures
expires. Such an issue has not been touched upon in the
switched system literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
necessary background and establishes a stochastic model in
which security indices are embedded. Security indices are
formally defined in the section. Their relations to diagnosis,
estimation, and control are delineated. Section 3 examines
the computational issues associated with evaluating the
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indices through an example of a three-area power system.
Section 4 presents the results of a simulation study on the
performance robustness of the proposed secondary pro-
tection. Section 5 draws conclusions on the technology
readiness for implementing the secondary protection. The
Appendix provides an aggregated discrete-state stochastic
model used for reliability analysis, a typical continuous-
state classical swing model used for transient stability
analysis, and a typical electric transmission network model
used for diagnosis.
2 A stochastic model controlled by the secondary
protection
This section reviews a previously defined modeling
principle [16], which uses security indices as protective
control criteria. The new development shifts the emphasis
to modeling the protection misoperations and recovery
processes and to delineating the secondary protective
control problem. Many concepts and definitions in this
section are inherited from the authors’ recent preliminary
study [22].
2.1 Security indices and reliability
The presentation of this subsection draws heavily from
[16] for the purpose of review of background. An N  1
secure system maintains its transient stability upon the
prompt removal of a single piece (group) of equipment
which has experienced a critical fault. A critical fault refers
to one that inevitably leads to a system outage in the
absence of an appropriate protective control action.
The discrete state-space of a power system model shown
in Fig. 1a consists of a normal state p (pre-fault), an
aggregated outage state o and a set of N degraded yet
operational states d1,   , di,   , dN , each corresponding to
a post-fault state upon the removal of the equipment
experiencing a critical fault. Associated with each degra-
ded discrete state di, there is a set of parameters: transition
rate ki from pre-fault state p, restoration rate c or ci into
state p, and sequential fault transition rate ki into outage
state o. si is the conditional probability of successful state
transition into di given the occurrence of critical fault i, and
si ¼ 1 si. si and si are named security index and risk
index, respectively. They are introduced in a manner sup-
ported by the Poisson decomposition property [23]. The
term security index is coined because it is directly pro-
portional to a probabilistic measure of post-fault transient
stability.
Define steady-state probabilities p0 ¼ pp, pi ¼ pdi ,
i ¼ 1;    ;N, and pNþ1 ¼ po, or in vector form
p ¼ ½ p0    pNþ1 . The grid availability (adequacy) is
given by
As ¼ p0 þ p1 þ    þ pN ; and unavailability As ¼ pNþ1.
The steady-state probabilities can be solved from the
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation _p ¼ pQ at steady-state pQ
¼ 0; PNþ1i¼0 pi ¼ 1, where Q is the rate transition matrix,
as explicitly expressed in Appendix A. Since the model in
Fig. 1a is of finite state and irreducible, a unique steady
state probability distribution exists [24]. System availabil-
ity can be expressed explicitly as a function of security
indices upon exploiting the structure of Q matrix [16],





; p0 ¼ c
cþPNi¼1 ki  sikiðcicÞciþki
n o
The above establishes that the grid availability is mono-
tonically increasing with respect to each security index
associated with a critical fault, provided that restoration to
pre-fault state from a degraded state is faster than that from
system outage, i.e., ci[ c, which always holds for any
well-designed power systems. Computation of security
indices and the control mechanism to maximize them are
the focal points of discussion in [16]. This paper reexam-
ines the definition and computation of security indices
specific to the secondary protection that deals with
misoperations of the existing primary protection and with
their recovery processes.
2.2 Protection misoperation and recovery processes
Inability to recover from protection false trips in power
systems is a top root cause of the modern-day cascading
failures [1]. In this regard, the framework developed in [16]
becomes inadequate for two reasons: (1) The stochastic
discrete-state model there does not capture misoperation















(b) N degraded states aggregated 






Fig. 1 Rate transition diagrams
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impeded in terms of understanding the fundamentals and
quantifying the computational and technological require-
ments for an effective secondary protective control strat-
egy; (2) The traditional continuous-state model ignores the
electric network dynamics and considers only the much
slower electromechanical dynamics. This severely limits
our ability to promptly identify fault modes necessary for
correct execution of the secondary protection functions in
the face of primary protection misoperations. Typical
modern relays for primary protection operate in 8–10 ms,
and circuit breakers clear a fault in 30–50 ms [13].
To include the processes of protection misoperations
and their recoveries while keeping the model simple and
scalable, the N degraded states in Fig. 1a are aggregated
into a single degraded state d as depicted in Fig. 1b,
resulting in a 3-state availability model with less detailed





















They are obtained using the superposition property of
Poisson processes [24]. The monotonic dependence of




kkþ ckþ ccþ skcþ skc ð1Þ
To observe protection misoperation and recovery pro-
cesses, pre-fault state p is split into pre-fault p (or 0) and
pre-fault false trip t (or 4) states, degraded state d is split
into fault-on f (or 1) and degraded d (or 2) states, and
system outage state o is split into misoperation fault-on m
(or 3) and system outage o (or 5) states. The new 6-state
model is shown in Fig. 2b. For an N  1–secure power
system, discrete-states p (or 0), d (or 2), and t (or 4) are to
be called secure (or transiently stable) states hereafter.
During the holding time at each of these discrete-states, the
continuous-state (Section 2.3) evolves in the neighborhood
of a stable equilibrium. States f (or 1) and m (or 3) are to be
called insecure states as they are transiently unstable. State
o (or 5) alone is called an outage state. Upon entering a
discrete-state i, the evolution of the system’s continuous-
state ðx; nÞ is governed by a pair of differential equations
[22].
At any given moment of time, a power system of any
size and complexity resides in one of the 6 states in the
semi-Markov chain (or Markov chain if transition rates are
constants) depicted in Fig. 2b. A state holding time (so-
journ time) is the random amount of time that the chain
stays at a state. The average holding time at state 2, for
example, is 1=K2 where K2 ¼ k20 þ k23 þ k25. Typically
transition rates in Fig. 2b range from 1/weeks (k01, k15, k25,
k35), to 1/days (k23, k43, k50), to 1/hours (k20, k40), to 1/AC-
cycles (k12 and k32). It is noted that the values for k12 and
k32 reflect the speed of operation of the primary protection
without any misoperations. The inter-event time distribu-
tions can be established by using standard statistic meth-
ods, such as parameter estimation and goodness of fit tests
[25], based on the data collected.
Some transitions in Fig. 2b can be influenced through
systematic decision and control with real-time information
feedback. These are called controllable transitions. This
paper focuses on two types of the controllable transitions.
Referring to Fig. 2b, at the fault-on state f, a protection
misoperation occurs when an outgoing transition either
falsely trips into misoperation state m, or fails to trip cor-
rectly into degraded secure state d within a specified time
limit set for the existing primary protection. Thus the
concern on the high frequency of protection misoperations
is reflected in the need to use a secondary protective control
to reduce the risk index s12 to be as close to 0 as possible.
The role of s12 in Fig. 2b is similar to that of s in Fig. 2a. At
misoperated state m, on the other hand, the secondary
protection is relied on to help the system recover into state
d rather than allowing the system to cascade into outage
state o. Thus the concern on the largely absent systematic
recovery scheme from a misoperated primary protection
system is reflected in the need to raise s32 (from 0) to as
close to 1 as possible. Transition from outage state o or
degraded state d to normal state p is referred to as
restoration, which is in fact controllable. The topic on
restoration from system outage [26], is faced with a dif-
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Fig. 2 Rate transition diagram with protection misoperations
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Despite its simplicity, the 6-state model contains the
essential and quantifiable information necessary for
imposing computational and technological requirements.
For example, the event probabilities [24] can be solved as
Prob ½djf  ¼ s12; Prob½djm  s32; k32[ [ k35 ð2Þ
and the first order approximation of the system’s
availability can be derived from the steady-state
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation associated with the
Markov chain in Fig. 2b (Appendix A)





where p0  1 can be assumed for any functioning power
system.
The modeling process discussed in this section is
applicable to the higher resolution model in Fig. 1a, which
contains N degraded states for N critical faults. Splitting
each of these states yields a discrete state-space formed
from the direct product of a composite set of binary
equipment states ffaulty; degradedg and a composite set of
binary relay states frestrain; operateg, respectively. Thus
the 6-state model in Fig. 2b is expansible systematically to
any desired resolution. Transition rates associated with
failure and misoperation processes generally increase lin-
early with the system size in the aggregated model as
dictated by the Poisson superposition property [24]. Thus
the model in the form of Fig. 2b is also scalable, and the
monotonic dependence of availability on security indices
remains true.
2.3 Continuous-state dynamics during the holding
time at a discrete-state
Upon entering each discrete-state i, the evolution of
continuous-state vectors ðx; nÞ representing generator rotor
dynamics, and electric dynamics of the transmission net-
work, respectively, is governed by a pair of differential
equations from the set f _x ¼ /iðx; nÞ; _n ¼ giðx; nÞg partic-
ular to discrete-state i, as seen in Fig. 2b. Set notation f:g
signifies that if state i is aggregated, it can have multiple
continuous-state dynamics associated with different system
configurations. The dimension and content in ðx; nÞ depend
on the prevailing system configuration. Such a system is
sometimes called a hybrid system [27].
The new development in this paper is centered around
introducing secondary protective control functions to
recover from a primary protection misoperation. To that
end the following discussion focuses on the recovery pro-
cess from m to d, using the simple framework of Fig. 2b.
The discussion on the transition from f to d can follow a
similar path, and in fact has, to a certain extent, been
elaborated on in [16].
Transient stability of a power system is defined for the
slower electro-mechanical dynamics [14], where state x
contains typically relative rotor angles of all synchronous
generators and deviations of their angular speeds; whereas
the transients in the continuous-state n are governed by the
dynamics of the passive electric transmission network, and
are assumed to settle instantaneously with respect to the
settling time of transients in x. This work abandons such
steady-state notions as phasors. Instead, the time-domain
waveforms of node voltages and lumped line currents
constitute the components of n. The two coupled differ-
ential equations at discrete-state d, for example, _x ¼
/dðx; nÞ and _n ¼ gdðx; nÞ can be replaced by a differential-
algebraic system _x ¼ /dðx; nÞ and 0 ¼ gdðx; nÞ, from
which component n can be eliminated from the differential
equation [14]. With some abuse of notation, _x ¼ /dðxÞ is
used to describe the electromechanical dynamics in the
following development. On the other hand, it is shown in
Section 3.1 that the slow dynamics that enter _n ¼ gdðx; nÞ
can be accurately estimated as a part of an input to the
electric network using the synchronized high rate wave-
form samples of PMU-like devices [22]. Thus _n ¼
g^dðx^; nÞ ¼ gdðnÞ hereafter with some abuse of notation.
From this point on, the dynamic descriptions of x and n are
assumed decoupled, and they will be employed to evaluate
control performance and diagnosis performance, respec-
tively. The relevant continuous-state dynamics to the pro-
cess of recovery from misoperations, among all expressed
in Fig. 2b, are
f _x ¼ /mðxÞg; tm\t\td ð4Þ
f _x ¼ /dðxÞg; td  t\1 ð5Þ
The notations above are borrowed from [15]. The holding
times are those of the misoperated dynamics and the post-
fault (degraded) dynamics, necessary for studying the
recovery process. Also relevant are the pre-fault dynamics
f _x ¼ /pðxÞg for t\tf and fault-on dynamics f _x ¼ /f ðxÞg
for tf\t\td if the post-fault dynamics f _x ¼ /dðxÞg are
entered at t ¼ td with rate s12k12, or misoperated dynamics
f _x ¼ /mðxÞg are entered at t ¼ tm with rate s12k12. Though
outage state can also be transitioned into from state f,
which occurs when there is a second equipment fault, it is
considered much less likely as k15 is very small. The
operating principle for protection functions to achieve
s12\\s12 has been considered in [16].
The initial continuous-state (x) at tm, upon entering
discrete-state m, is inherited from the final continuous-state
arrived at the expiration of the holding time at the
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originating state f, or d, or t, whose dynamics are defined
by fð/f=d=t; gf=d=tÞg. The initial continuous-state at td upon
entering state d is inherited from the final continuous-state
arrived at the expiration of the holding time at the origi-
nating state f or m defined by f/m=f g. Since the holding
time at state m is on average much shorter than that in state
d, the latter is assumed to last till the infinitely remote
future to simplify the discussion of transient stability and
the definition of a stability region. Denote the stability
region (region of attraction) [15] of a post-fault system
around its stable equilibrium by AðxeÞ  fxj limt!1 wd
ðx; tÞ ¼ xeg, where wdðx; tÞ is the post-fault continuous-
state governed by (5) initiated at x.
Our approach to answering whether the fault-on elec-
tromechanical state is in the post-fault boundary of AðxeÞ
characterized off-line [15] by tracking the state in real-
time. Further, we ask whether a secondary protection can
be devised to establish AðxeÞ that encloses the electrome-
chanical state in the face of misoperations of the primary
protection. This is equivalent to driving the insecure state
m to secure state d before the system enters outage state
o within a small fraction of a second.
2.4 Maximally secure secondary protection
Consider an N–1–secure system with N critical equip-
ment faults. Let U denote the set of admissible secondary
control actions, and Um the set of actions admissible at state
m. To render a successful recovery from a protection
misoperation by the secondary protection, the N þ 1
operation modes from the set
ff0; f1;    ; fNg ð6Þ
must be distinguishable in the face of a misoperation,
where f0 denotes the normal mode and fi, i ¼ 1; 2;    ;N,
denotes the ith fault mode. System outage state is excluded
as it requires a much different functionality from that of the
secondary protection [26]. Note that states and modes are
two different sets, because mode fi may be related to one of
many possible fault-on states corresponding to different
protective control actions. Table 1 imposes the desired
secondary protection functions. Consider security profile
[22] associated with fault mode fi and admissible secondary
protective control u 2 Um ¼ fu1;    ; uMg exerted at some
t[ tm tf to attempt recovery from a protection
misoperation
sfi;uðtÞ ¼ pfiðtÞcfi;uðtÞ ð7Þ
pfiðtÞ in (7) is the mode probability distribution profile
conditioned on control action u applied at time t
pðtÞ ¼ ðpf0ðtÞ; pf1ðtÞ;    ; pfN ðtÞÞ ð8Þ
as the outcome of a diagnosis process, such as that
computed by a multiple-model diagnosis algorithm [11].





representing the probability that the system enters a post-
fault stability region defined by characteristic function
Jfi;uðxÞ associated with control action u exerted at time
t[ tm[ tf . Stability can be estimated using the energy
function method [28, 29], in which generator parameter
uncertainty can also be considered [16]. If the time t  tm
the system spends at the insecure state m is longer than the
critical clearing time for fault mode fi, control u can no
longer establish a stability region to enclose the departing
state wmðx; tÞ and the system enters the outage state instead.
fðx^Þðt; xÞ in (9) is a snapshot at time t of the probability
density function for the estimate of electromechanical state
(or rotor state) x ¼ ðd; DxÞ. The distribution can be esti-
mated by formulating a maximum likelihood problem
[30, 31], where the parameters in a family of distributions
are optimized to fit the data.
Time td, at which a secondary protective control action
is exerted, can be determined by tracking each sfi;uðtÞ in










is applied. Referring to Fig. 2b, the aggregated security
index s32 afforded by the secondary protective control
u can be identified with sfi;uðtdÞ ¼ p32ðtdÞc32ðtdÞ, which
Table 1 Desired secondary protection functions
True mode Identified mode by primary protection Control action by secondary protection
fi fi No action
fi, i[ 0 f0 Recover from failure to trip
fi fj, j 6¼ i Recover from false trip
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measures the probability of successful recovery from a
protection misoperation. s32 ¼ 1 s32 ¼ p32 þ p32c32 ¼
c32 þ c32p32. u	 is optimal because it maximizes the secu-
rity of the controlled transition.
3 Computation of security indices
The feasibility of the proposed secondary protective
control strategy hinges on our ability to compute security
indices fast enough for real-time mitigation of cascading
failures. As discussed above, the computation involves
carrying out fault coverage (9) and fault mode probability
(7). This section explains the various aspects of security
index computation through a power system example.
The one-line diagram of the WSCC 3-generator 9-bus
model [32] in Fig. 3 is now used to demonstrate compu-
tational and other technological issues. Each generator is
regarded as aggregated for an area based on the concept of
coherence [33]. The transmission lines are modeled as P–
circuits, and each load is modeled as a constant impedance
based on the nominal power flow solution. Only the
transmission line faults of three phase to ground short
circuits are considered. The time domain parameters and
the design models are given in Appendix C. All time-do-
main circuit parameters are derived from the corresponding
60 Hz impedances in per unit on a 100-MVA base. Three
PMU-like sensors are located at buses 4, 7, and 9 with
fiber-optic links in between. The channel capacity, data
transfer rates, and electromagnetic immunity of such links
relieve us from being drawn to the discussion of commu-
nication issues.
Three assumptions/conditions are stated for the follow-
ing discussion. (1) The system under study has been
planned to be N1–secure, which meets the broad NERC
standard, and all post-fault stability regions have been
estimated off-line. (2) At most one piece of equipment is
tripped at a given time. Thus any equipment removal
decision by the secondary protection must be preceded by a
reinstatement of a previously tripped piece of equipment.
(3) The system has the knowledge of the protective control
action taken and the action time (tm or td), whereas it relies
on the secondary protective control strategy to isolate an
equipment fault and estimate fault onset time (tf ).
3.1 Electromechanical state tracking using input
samples of PMU-like sensors
There are two reasons for tracking a generator’s rotor
angle and angular speed deviation in real-time. (i) They are
needed in Section 3.2 for profiling securities using (9), and,
(ii) they are needed in Section 3.3 as inputs to the design
models of diagnosis filters.
Express the internal voltage e(t) of a generator as
eðtÞ ¼ EðtÞcosðx0t þ dðtÞÞ, where E(t) is the magnitude,
x0 is the nominal angular speed, dðtÞ is the phase angle,
and speed deviation DxðtÞ ¼ ddðtÞ=dt. E(t) and DxðtÞ are
assumed to vary slowly with time due to the machine
inertia and magnetic flux, even in the event of transmission
line faults [14, 32]. In this case, e(t) is considered to be a
quasi-steady-state sinusoidal voltage signal, and can be
used as a signal model to track ðDxðtÞ; dðtÞ;EðtÞÞ, pro-
vided that the terminal voltage v(t) and current i(t) in the
following equation:
eðtÞ ¼ vðtÞ þ L diðtÞ
dt
ð12Þ
are both measured and sufficiently excited, where L is the
sum of the transient inductance of the generator and the
leakage inductance of its step up transformer. Suppose the
sample interval of the PMU acquired signals from the
secondary windings of instrument transformers is Dt . The
following nonlinear signal model was used to track the
internal voltage (12), or equivalently, to estimate
xðtkÞ ¼ ðDxðtkÞ; dðtkÞ;EðtkÞÞ
yðkÞ  vðkDtÞ þ L iðkDtÞ  iððk  1ÞDtÞ
Dt
¼ EðkÞ cosðx0kDt þ DxðkÞkDt þ /ðkÞÞ þ ðkÞ
 hðxðkÞÞ þ ðkÞ
ð13Þ
One approach to state tracking is to implement nonlinear
recursive least-squares with an extended Kalman filter [30]
using state evolution xðtkþ1Þ ¼ xðtkÞ þ wðtkÞ, where w has
a zero mean and an appropriately selected covariance to
balance between the accuracy and speed of the estimate.
Because the estimates are obtained using only local
PMU input samples at the high side terminals the genera-
tors, no remote data exchange is needed. It is important to
note that the estimate does not involve any swing dynam-































Fig. 3 One-line diagram of the WSCC 9-bus system [32]
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A recursive least-squares algorithm is implement using
an extended Kalman filter for the 9-bus system of Fig. 3.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4. Simulated
sample paths on the three generators’ terminal voltage and
current waveforms, rotor angles, and angular speed devi-
ations are displayed that contain consecutive durations at
normal, fault-on, protection false trip, and post-fault
operations. The system starts with a normal operation. A
mid-point short to ground fault in line 5-7 occurs at 0.3 s.
into the simulation. Line 7-8 is falsely removed at 0.4 s.,
which renders the system enter insecure state m. The fault
is cleared at 0.5 s. by reconnecting line 7-8 and removing
line 5-7. The recovered system enters and stays at state
d (post-fault) from 0.5 s. till the end of the simulation. The
electro-mechanical states of the three generators are esti-
mated based on the measurement model in (13). The esti-
mates are obtained using the local PMU-like sensor input
waveforms at 24 samples/cycle at the high side terminals of
the step up transformer of a generator. The estimation
algorithm does not involve any swing dynamics.
3.2 Stability region computation and security
profiling
Stability regions (regions of attraction) are discussed in
Section 2.3 and are defined based on the classical electro-
mechanical dynamics described in Appendix B under
normal or post-fault conditions. In Fig. 5, the regions
enclosed by the color-coded curves are the intersections of
d31-d21 plane with Dxi ¼ 0, i ¼ 1; 2; 3, and the post-fault
stability regions when one of the six transmission lines has
been removed. The regions are obtained conservatively by
the closest unstable equilibrium point (UEP) method [28].
The dashed curves emanating from the pre-fault equilib-
rium are the six fault-on trajectories without tripping the
faulted lines. The trajectories are obtained by simulating
the system’s fault-on continuous-state, starting from the
pre-fault equilibrium. These trajectories cross the bound-
aries of their respective post-fault stability regions in
200–400 milliseconds (critical clearance times).
The window shaped curves in Fig. 6 are coverage pro-
files evaluated using (9) with some simplifying approxi-
mations, when a mid-point short to ground fault in Line 5-7
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Fig. 5 Stability regions and fault-on trajectories
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protection misoperations with a line falsely tripped (in-
stantaneously at the onset of a fault t ¼ 0), and the
recovery from the false trip occurs at t when the secondary
protection takes a corrective control action. The largest
window corresponds to the the recovery from a false trip of
Line 4-5, and the window size may be attributed to the
complete loss of Load A. The profiles in Fig. 6 indicate that
the window of opportunity for recovery from a misopera-
tion (from m to d), or seconary protection, is almost as wide
as primary protection (from f to d). On the other hand, both
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 reveal that the system’s electromechanical
continuous-state as well as the coverage profiles are
insufficiently responsive for use to identify transmission
line fault modes within the time window of opportunities.
The dashed curve marked pð5;7ÞðtÞ hints that if a mode
probability (mode fi = Line 5-7 short-circuited) can dis-
tinguish itself well within the critical clearance time from
the other mode probabilities, the recovery probability
sð5;7ÞðtdÞ ¼ cð5;7Þ;uð5;7Þ ðtdÞpð5;7ÞðtdÞ as given in (7) can be
high, where td is less than the associated critical clearance
time.
3.3 Fault diagnosis based on PMU input samples
and electric network dynamics
The necessity for including fault diagnosis in the sec-
ondary protection has been established in 3.2. The multi-
ple-model filtering method [34, 35] is applied to fault mode
diagnosis for the 9-bus system equipped with a network of
3 PMU-like sensors in [22]. More specifically, a bank of
Kalman filters corresponding to different fault modes are
executed in parallel. Each filter is built on a design model
based on a particular configuration of the electric
network.
An example of a design model of such filters is given in
Appendix C with inputs being the estimated internal gen-
erator voltages, states being the independent inductor cur-
rents and capacitor voltages in the fictitious lumped circuit
models of the electric network, and outputs being the time-
tagged input samples of voltage and current waveforms of
PMU-like sensors. The number of design models associ-
ated with each fault mode is minimized by heuristic means
to balance between complexity of a filter bank and the
accuracy of diagnosis outcome. Assuming a multivariate
Gaussian distribution for the output residuals ~nfiðtkÞ of a
filter, probability qnfi ðtkÞ, indicating how likely the
observed system inputs and outputs are associated with an
assumed model, can be obtained [36]. The probability that
a model infers a system mode conditioned on the mea-





This implements the mode probability distribution defined
in (8).
Figure 7 shows an example of the fault diagnosis results
for the aggregated discrete-state as defined in Fig. 2b, and
model probability. The PMU input waveforms are sampled
at 24 samples/cycle with signal to noise ratio at 15 dB. The
system experiences the same sequence of events as those in
Fig. 4. Based on the operation of breakers, three banks of
filters are used. The first set of filters, consisting of a
normal design model and 6 design models for 6 line faults,
runs from 0 to 0.4 s. The second and third sets of filters
which, consisting of a post-fault design model and 5
misoperated design models, run from 0.4 to 0.5 s and 0.5 to
1.0 s, respectively. Note that only 4 model probabilities are
indicated in the legend, while a total of 19 filters are used
during the diagnosis process [22]. Our results show an
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Fig. 7 Fault diagnosis results
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23 ms, a little over one AC cycle, without counting com-
munication delays. The more subtle issues of this diagnosis
approach, such as scalability and model selection are
reported separately in [11].
4 Performance analysis of the secondary
protection via hybrid simulation
A hybrid simulation program is developed to assess the
performance of the secondary protection. Here, hybrid
refers to the integration of both continuous-state simulation
and discrete event simulation. The discrete event simula-
tion is modeled as a finite state automaton based on Fig. 2b,
where most transitions occur randomly based on the inter-
event distributions whose parameters are given in Table 1
of [22].
A typical simulation cycle of the hybrid simulation goes
as follows. (1) Generate next stochastic discrete event
based on inter-event distributions feasible at the current
state. (2) Determine the power system configuration and
generate the continuous state trajectories until the discrete-
state holding time expires. (3) Determine the controlled
transition based on the outcomes of fault coverage evalu-
ation and fault diagnosis. (4) Enter the next discrete-state
and a new cycle starts. Fig. 8 depicts the hybrid simulation
schematic with the secondary protective control. The
hybrid simulation is implemented in MATLAB. Fig. 9
illustrates some fine points in a typical simulation process.
A simulated sample path of a one-year duration is shown in
Fig. 10 based on the scalable model in Fig. 2b specialized
to the 9-bus system in Fig. 3.
The top panel of Fig. 9 shows the evolution of aggre-
gated discrete-state in the 3-generator 9-bus system [32] as
a sample path of a 8760-hour long hybrid simulation. The
lower panel shows the evolutions of the discrete-state and
the continuous-state over a 1-s time span at around the
1370th hour into the simulation. The continuous-state plot
shows two rotor angle components relative to the third
rotor angle. It is the brief holding time of a few ten mil-
liseconds first at state ‘1’ due to a short circuit in a
transmission line, followed by another brief holding time of
a few ten milliseconds at state ‘3’ due to a relay false trip
that causes the rotor angles to depart. The recovery to
secure state ‘2’ eventually brings the rotor angles to a new
stable equilibrium, which takes a few hundred ms to settle
[38].
The results in Table 2 are obtained from the output
analysis of the hybrid simulation. In particular the event
probability, analytically expressed in (2) of Section 2.2, is
estimated by performing the output analyses of the sample













Fig. 8 Hybrid simulation schematic with the secondary protective
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Fig. 10 Hybrid Simulation Results
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location of a short circuit fault is uniformly distributed
along any section of a transmission line, whereas the
diagnosis is carried out by using two representative models
per transmission line. The two- model/transmission line is
determined heuristically by the desired accuracy of the
diagnosis outcome.
Dramatic increase in recovery probability expressed as
Prob½djm  s32 in (2) is attained (from 0 to more than 0.4).
As a result, N  1–secure state probability p2 is also sig-
nificantly increased and outage state probability po is
decreased. State probabilities at two insecure states are not
shown in Table 2 because they are negligibly small.
A significant advantage of using a hybrid simulation is
its flexibility in specifying the clock structure and event
lives so that inter-event time distributions can closely
conform to reality without subject to the homogeneous
Markovian assumption. The latter is desired to gain qual-
itative insights in analytic forms, as seen in (2) and (3) in
Section 2.2. Simulation results presented here are mostly
drawn from [38], where more details of our study through
hybrid simulation can be found.
5 Conclusions and future work
New developments are made in the following areas in
this paper:  Misoperation and recovery processes are
incorporated into a scalable stochastic availability model
where security indices enter to quantify the effectiveness of
the secondary protection for mitigation of cascading fail-
ures due to misoperations; ` Real-time computation of
such security indices is tackled by simultaneous tracking of
the fault-on electromechanical state to provide the proba-
bility of post-fault transient stability, and electric network
state to provide the model probability distribution for a
given secondary protective control action, both with the
input samples of PMU-like sensors; ´ The proposed sec-
ondary protective control strategy capitalizes on the rapid
entry of networked high sample rate sensors to provide
real-time decision support cost-effectively for security
enhancement without compromising the dependability
offered by the existing primary protection. Therefore a new
step has been taken towards realizing a cost-effective
mitigation strategy of cascading failures and the goal is
within our reach provided that current technological and
computational potentialities are fully exploited.
Because of the extreme complexity of the mitigation
problem at hand, many simplifications have been made in
this paper. First in the small 9-bus system the state-space
representation of the full electric network is involved. For a
larger system, use of partitioned electric networks as the
design models of diagnosis filters is necessary to reduce
both computational and communications complexity. It is
also desirable to develop a formal procedure for selection
of the number of design models of diagnosis filters to
balance between diagnosis accuracy and computational
complexity.
As new sensing and control devices continue to enter the
grid, consideration to mitigate protection misoperations
should be incorporated into device placement criteria
involving the dynamics of the electric network [39], and
the average sensor data availability [40]. Finally, the
maximally secure mitigation strategy of protection
misoperations can be regarded as a special solution of a
Markov decision problem [24, 41] where a greedy policy is
sought in the sense that it focuses on the immediate secu-
rity concern. It would be desirable to investigate whether
the generalization to a longer time horizon policy involving
a sequence of high rate transitions, from state f to m to d,
for example, could lead to a mitigation strategy that better
benefits the power system reliability.
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Appendix A: Rate transition matrix for the model
in Fig. 2b
Q ¼
q00 k01 0 0 k04 0
0 q11 s12k12 s12k12 0 k15
k20 0 q22 k23 0 k25
0 0 s32k32 q33 0 s32k32 þ k35
k40 0 0 k43 q44 0





















Table 2 Steady-state probabilities at state p (or 0), d (or 2), and o (or
5), as well as event probability for recovery from a primary misop-
eration, with and without the secondary protection
p0 p2 p5 Prob[d|m]
w/o secondary protection 0.9425 0.0165 0.0406 0.0000
w/ secondary protection 0.9643 0.0212 0.0137 0.4024
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where q00 ¼ k01  k04, q11 ¼ k12  k15, q22 ¼ k20
k23  k25, q33 ¼ k32  k35, q44 ¼ k40  k43, and
q55 ¼ k50.
Appendix B: Classical electromechanical dynamics
A 2n state classical n-generator model [32] is a sim-
plified power system model of the following form
_di ¼ XDxi;
D _xi ¼ 1
2Hi
Pmi  Pei  DiDxi
 
;
Pei ¼ E2i Gi þ
Xn
j¼1;j6¼i
EiEjYij cos ðwij  di þ djÞ;
ðB1Þ
with rotor angle di in rad., and angular speed deviation Dxi
in per unit (pu) associated with the ith generator. Other
parameters are inertia Hi, damping coefficient Di,
mechanical power input Pmi , electrical power output P
e
i ,
and generator internal voltage Ei. Yij\wij is the transfer
admittance between generators i and j in the reduced
admittance matrix Y which retains only nodes as the gen-
erators’ terminals. Gi is the real part of the ith diagonal
element of Y. Coefficient X converts the rotor speed
deviation from per unit to rad./sec. The classical model is
commonly used for studying the transient stability [28] of a
power system.
Appendix C: Dynamics of the electric network
for the 3-generator 9-bus system
The transmission lines are modeled asP-circuits and the
transmission network is modeled based on Kirchhoff’s
circuit laws. Table C1 shows the equivalent time domain
parameters for each P circuit in the 3-generator 9-bus
system.
The independent currents of the inductors and the
voltages of the capacitors are selected as states. The fol-
lowing is the electric network dynamics in state-space form
for the 9-bus system at the pre-fault state. It is used as a
design model at pre-fault for one of the multiple model
filters used for fault diagnosis. During the normal opera-
tion, the system is of 18th order. The reader is referred to
Fig. 3 for the definition of the circuit parameters and
variables.
Let C4 ¼ 0:5ðC45 þ C46Þ, C5 ¼ 0:5ðC45 þ C57Þ, C6 ¼
0:5ðC69 þ C46Þ, C7 ¼ 0:5ðC57 þ C78Þ, C8 ¼ 0:5ðC78
þC89Þ, and C9 ¼ 0:5ðC69 þ C89Þ. The following are the 18
state equations of the linear electric network. C4v
0
4 ¼
i41  i45  i46, C5v05 ¼ i5A þ i75 þ i45, C6v06 ¼ i6Bþ
i96 þ i46, C7v07 ¼ i72  i78  i75, C8v08 ¼ i8C þ i78 þ i98,
C9v
0
9 ¼ i93  i98  i96, LAi05A ¼ v5  RAi5A, LBi06B ¼ v6
RBi6B, LCi
0
8C ¼ v8  RCi8C, L1i041 ¼ v4  e1, L45i045 ¼ v4
v5  R45i45, L46i046 ¼ v4  v6  R46i46, L2i072 ¼ v7  e2,
L57i
0
75 ¼ v7  v5  R57i75, L78i078 ¼ v7  v8  R78i78, L3i093
¼ v9  e3, L69i069 ¼ v9  v6  R69i69, and L89i098 ¼ v9
v8  R89i98. e1ðtÞ, e2ðtÞ, and e3ðtÞ are the inputs to the
linear network, which are considered known as they are
quasi steady-state sinusoidal signals expressed in (13) with
parameters estimated by using the input samples discussed
in Section 3.1. The next set is the 12 output equations of
the network, representing all measurements made by the 3
PMUs. y1 ¼ v4, y2 ¼ i41, y3 ¼ i45 þ C452C4 ði41  i45  i46Þ,
y4 ¼ i46 þ C462C4 ði41  i45  i46Þ, y5 ¼ v7, y6 ¼ i75 þ
C57
2C7
ði72  i75  i78Þ, y7 ¼ i72, y8 ¼ i78 þ C782C7 ði72
i75  i78Þ, y9 ¼ v9, y10 ¼ i96 þ C692C9 ði93  i96  i98Þ, y11 ¼
i98 þ C892C9 ði93  i96  i98Þ, and y12 = i93. The model order
varies as the power system configuration changes. At the
occurrence of a short to ground fault, the model order
becomes 19 because a transmission line is broken into two.
At the removal of a transmission line, the order of the
model is reduced to 17. These models serve as design
models in the multiple-model diagnosis filter banks dis-
cussed in Sections 3.3.
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